BP - A history of risks and blunders

An excellent article by the NY Times reviews the history of BP, especially since 1995 when it started a strategy of taking on "the tough stuff that others cannot or choose not to do," as its chief executive, Tony Hayward, once put it."

The article reviews some of the past BP disasters at the Thunder Horse drilling platform, Prudhoe Bay pipeline, and the Texas City refinery. 

"They were very arrogant and proud and in denial," said Steve Arendt, a safety specialist who assisted the panel appointed by BP to investigate the company's refineries after a deadly 2005 explosion at its Texas City, Tex., facility.

"The way safety is measured is generally around worker injuries and days away from work, and that measure of safety is irrelevant when you are looking at the likelihood that a facility like an oil refinery could explode," said David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health. "This is comparable to saying that an airline is safe because the pilots and mechanics haven't been injured."

BP was run "like a financial company, rotating managers into new jobs with tough profit targets and then moving them before they had to deal with the consequences. The troubled Texas City refinery, for example, had five managers in six years."

"In effect, it appears that BP repeatedly chose risky procedures in order to reduce costs and save time and made minimal efforts to contain the added risk," wrote Henry A. Waxman, the committee chairman, and Bart Stupak, chairman of its subcommittee on oversight and investigations.

"There is a complete contradiction between BP's words and deeds. You were brought in to make safety the top priority of BP. But under your leadership, BP has taken the most extreme risks."

"BP cut corner after corner to save a million dollars here and a few hours there," Mr. Waxman said. "And now the whole Gulf Coast is paying the price."